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Recent Decisions
ANTI-TRUST - 1914 CLAYTON ACT CONSTRUED TO BAR
VERTICAL STOCK ACQUISITIONS
During the 1917-19 period DuPont acquired 23% of the outstanding
capital stock of General Motors. Thirty years later the government
brought an action contending that such interest enabled DuPont to
achieve a commanding' position as General Motors' chief supplier of
automotive finishes and fabrics. The Supreme Court in a 4 to 2 de-
cision,2 affirmed the government's contention, and declared the acquisi-
don a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.3  Justice Brennan,
speaking for the court, stated that the Clayton Act was designed to
"arrest... monopolies in their incipiency and before consummation, '4 -
"incipiency" denoting, not the time when the stock was acquired (1917-
19), but when the acquisition threatens to ripen into the prohibited
effects (1947-57).5 The Act was construed to be applicable to vertical
as well as horizontal acquisitions In arriving at this determination the
court relied heavily upon Congressional intent and the 1950 Clayton Act
amendment 7
Prior to determining whether an acquisition may reasonably effect a
substantial restraint in a particular market, the court must determine the
extent of that market. In this case the court narrowly limited the rele-
vant market to automobile finishes and fabrics. Next the court de-
termined that the restraint in the relevant market was "substantial,"
1In 1947 General Motors purchased 68.4% of its automotive finish and 38.5%
of its fabrics from DuPont.
'United States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemors and Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
"No corporation.., shall acquire. . . the whole or any part of the stock.., of
another corporation... where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially
lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the cor-
poration making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or
community, or tend to create a monopoly.... ." 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. S
18 (1946). Note: This action is governed by the 1914 Clayton Act since the 1950
amendment does not relate back to prior acquisitions.
4S. Rep. No. 698, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
5Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 166 (3rd Cir. 1953).
'Vertical integration is the bringing together of various stages of production and/or
distribution under unified control. See HOAGLAND, CORPoRATION FNAMEc 620
(1947).
'House reports state that it is thought by some that the 1914 Act applied only to
horizontal mergers and therefore the purpose of the amendment was to make it clear
that § 7 applied to all types of acquisitions. H.R. Rmp. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 11 (1949).
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referring to the Standard Stations8 case as the basis for its decision. This
reference is significant, for Standard Stations, a section 3 Clayton Act
case, is considered to have established the test of "quantitative substan-
tiality" which heretofore had never -been applied in a section 7 case.
This test, in effect, provides that if the court determines that a substantial
quantity of the market is affected there is a presumption that a substan-
tial lessening of competition must result.9 If this test is determina-
tive the government no longer appears to have the burden of showing
the actual restraint of competition affected by the stock acquisition.
Justice Burton, with whom Justice Frankfurter joined, dissented
vigorously to the application of section 7 to a verical acquisition. His
position is supported by forty years of administrative practices and
prior judicial interpretations holding that prohibited acquisitions must
occur between competing companies.10 Also questioned is the validity
of permitting the government to bring this action thirty years after the
stock acquisition occurred. Prior section 7 violations were never prose-
cuted more than four years after the date of procurement.:1 To the
statute which provides that "no corporation . . . shall acquire . . ." the
court adds "or continue to hold."' 2 The dissent further asserts that mere
proof that DuPont sales of finishes and fabrics to General Motors were
large in volume and that General Motors was the leading manufacturer
of automobiles does not justify the finding of reasonable probability of
'Agreements by which Standard Oil obligated gasoline station operators to supply
their full requirements from Standard Oil were held as violating § 3 of the Clayton
Act. Control of 6.7% of the gasoline market, within the area of effective comped-
tion, was held sufficient to meet the substantialiy test. United States v. Standard
Oil Co. of Cal., 78 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
'For a discussion of "quantitative substantiality" see Handler, Quantitative Sub-
staotiality and the Celler-Kefauver Act -A Look at the Record, 7 MERCm L. REV.
279 (1956).
" Int'l Shoe v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 280 U.S. 291 (1930); Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926). For the one case holding §
7 applicable to vertical acquisitions see Ozdoba v. Verney Brunsuick Mills, Inc., 152
F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
'Int'l Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 280 U.S. 291 (1930); Transamerica
Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3rd Cir. 1953); V. Vivaudou, Inc. v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 54 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1931); Federal Trade Comm'n v.
Western Meat Co. 5 F. 2d 615 (3rd Cir. 1925); United States v. Republic Steel
Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ohio 1935); In re Vanadium-Alloys Steel Co., 18
F.T.C. 194 (1934).
'United States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co. 353 U.S. 586, 620 (1957).
Yet a similar interpretation was implied as early as 1926; In Federal Trade Comm'n
v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554, 561 (1926) the acquiring company also ac-
quired their competitor's assets. The court holding that the act (§ 7 Clayton) was
inapplicable to acquisition of assets and therefore the divesture of stock would serve
no practical purpose stated "The purpose of the act was to prevent continued holding
of stock and the peculiar evils incident thereto." (Emphasis added).
(March
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substantial restraint of trade. Thus it is apparent that the minority is
unwilling to assume a per se restraint based solely upon a determination
that a substantial portion of the market is affected by the stock acquisi-
tion.
The concept underlying antitrust regulations is the desire to insure
free competition. The Sherman Act'3 serves as the antitrust constitution
describing in general terms the prohibited evils. The cases under the
Act show no favoritism to vertical integration. 14 The Clayton Act aims at
arresting in their incipiency those business practices which might ripen
into a violation of the Sherman Act.15 But, like the Internal Revenue
Code, the Clayton Act is not without weasel words and loopholes' 8
which tend to frustrate the legislative intent to give its words the same
inclusive scope as the Sherman Act.'7 The court therefore has extended
the Clayton Act to overcome Congressional oversights and fulfill the
Sherman Act objectives. It adopts the civil law doctrine of judging each
case upon its merits with minimum emphasis on precedent. The con-
dusion is obvious. If the facts indicate that the General Motors' acquisi-
tion will, within reasonable probability culminate in condemned activity,
then under the Clayton Act, such culmination is to be prevented.
Precedent' 8 and past administrative policies' 9 exist indicating that
section 7 of the 1914 Clayton Act is not applicable to vertical acquisi-
tions. Outweighing such precedent and policy, however, is -prior court
construction that similarly worded section 2 of the Clayton Act is
applicable to vertical integration.2 ° Also, Congressional intent in the
- 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. 5§ 1 and 2 (1952).
"United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United States v. Yel-
low Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); United States v. Swift and Co., 286 U.S. 106
(1932); United States v. Lehigh Valley tR., 254 U.S. 255 (1920).
-S. REP. No. 698, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914). Transamerica Corp. v. Board
of Governors, 206 F. 2d 163, 166 (3rd Cir. 1953); United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Co., 264 F. 138, 162 (E.D. Miss. 1920).
"Typical is the "asset loophole" which made actions under § 7 of the Clayton Act
(before 1950 amendment) ineffective when the merger resulted in acquisition of
assets. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1918); and Justice
Brandeis' dissent in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Western Meat Cot, 272 U.S. 554
(1926).
"In United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 78 F. Supp. 850, 867 (S.D. Cal.
1948) the court pointed out that "what, in its result, is an unreasonable restraint
under the Sherman Act is, in its beginning, a subsantial restraint under the Clayton
Act if it is of a nature likely to achieve such result." (Emphasis supplied).
"See note 10 supra.
" F.T.C. Report on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions as cited in United States v.
E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 353 U.S. 616 (1957).
'Price discrimination, a type of vertical integration, was held to be a violation of S
2 of the Clayton Act in George Van Camp and Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278
U.S. 245 (1929).
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